Compressor Station Committee

This document contains the minutes of the meeting on August 5th, of the ad hoc Compressor Station Committee to evaluate and address the impact of the Williams Transco Compression Station Operation in Roseland, NJ. This was the second meeting of the committee, and the first at which representatives from the Williams Companies were present.

Meeting Location: Borough Hall, Roseland, NJ: August 5, 2013

Attendees:

Mayor John Duthie
Councilman David Jacobs
John Matthias, Office of Emergency Management

Dennis Morgen (Committee Chair)
Reuben Bedell
Alan Egger (Secretary)
Marcia Weinstein
Malvina Krane
Ben Krane
Claudia Reis

For Williams:
Chris Staffel (Public Outreach) Princeton, NJ: chris.staffel@williams.com)
Mario DiCocco (Director: Field Operations) Princeton, NJ: Mario.dicocco@williams.com)
Colin Wisser (District Operations Manager) No card given; reports to Mr. DiCocco

(Mr. DiCocco is an engineer with 36 years of experience at Williams).

Marcia Weinstein, Ben and Malvina Krane and Claudia Reis are new members of the ad hoc committee. Mr. and Mrs. Krane are also members of an independent committee of Roseland residents concerned with the negative impact of the compressor project. This committee is known as RACS: (Roseland Against the Compressor Station).

Dennis Morgen called the meeting to order 5:30. (It was the intent of the Williams personnel to make themselves available to the ad hoc committee, but not to the public meeting which followed at 7 PM).

The purpose of the meeting was to elicit responses to a series of seven questions formulated by the committee. The questions were forwarded to Williams in mid-July, allowing time for their personnel to formulate responses.

Ms. Staffel asked that we take a step back and review the timeline for the process of application and construction of the pipeline, beginning with the applications to FERC. Dennis Morgen asked that she not take committee time for this review as we'd all had ample exposure to that information. Instead, he asked that she begin by presenting the

company's responses to our submitted questions.

[The Q and A form a 3 page document, (attached hereto). Some of the comments supplementing the written responses follow]

It is William's practice and policy to release their Emergency Plans to emergency and first responder organizations but not to the public at large. It wasn't clear if this policy follows, or is required, under FERC guidelines.

The emergency valve shut-off procedures using a SCADA system (see previous minutes) were described. SCADA communications employ a dedicated microwave radio link for primary communications. Depending on the station architecture, a cellular or a landline line is used as a back-up link. In the event of the failure of both systems to communicate continuously to the monitoring staff (Houston, TX), an employee is dispatched to the station site for an assessment. (Personnel are normally on-site during weekdays from 7:30 AM to 3:30 PM in any event). Two employees are typically present, responsible for running tests on various components of the system. Out of hours dispatch of an employee was stated to take 20-30 minutes.

Dennis Morgen asked for an explanation of the compressor shut-down mechanisms. Mr. DiCocco explained that the conditions for automatic shutdown would include unusual motor vibration; overpressure gas flow conditions in the pipelines of the system; and unusually high temperature excursions within the system. Mr. Wisser said that the shutdown valves are located, typically, within 300 feet of the station, and other valves are located 4 to 15 miles beyond the station.

In light of past incidents (fires, explosions), documented as early as 1987, Rubin Bedell asked what steps Williams has taken to improve their safety record. The Williams personnel indicated that each such incident had a different cause, with different corrective actions taken. In discussion of a specific incident in Appomattox, VA, it had been determined that corroded pipe was the causative factor.

Dennis Morgen asked if pipe corrosion was the reason for recently replacing 0.4 miles of pipe in Roseland. Mr., DiCocco explained that the only reason was a requirement for a specified upgrade. Explaining, Mr. DiCocco described the requirements for various pipe sizes and conditions depending on the size of housing and/or office structures and population density. As these conditions change, so too do the specifications for the required piping. In this case the requirements were changed by PHMSA and the pipeline replacement was mandated.

(These requirements are set by the federal agency, PHMSA: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration).

Malvina Krane asked about procedures for inspection of the pipeline. Mr. DiCocco elaborated on the various methods including "smart pig" procedures (every 7 years); pressure monitoring; and visible inspections on foot, by drive-by, and by aircraft. Pipelines are required to function at 150 per cent of normal operating pressure.

As to the question regarding pipe corrosion, Mr. Wisser and Mr. DiCocco described two additional normal features of pipeline construction. In instances where pipe passes through swamps or other damp areas of ground, pipe is coated in concrete to assure that the pipe is not buoyant. Secondly, all pipes have a "Cathodic" coating: current is supplied to the coating (by periodically deployed rectifiers), maintaining a 0.85 Volt differential between the pipe and "ground." Such differential voltages retard corrosion. The Cathodic voltage readings are taken every other month to insure ongoing integrity of corrosion protection.

Marcia Weinstein asked about some of the resolutions passed in surrounding towns that resulted in action preventing compressor location, such as in Bloomfield, NJ. Mr. DiCocco said that there had never been a proposal to build a station in Bloomfield. Ben Krane said that town councils have passed resolutions to prevent the installation of pipelines near houses. He asked if the company had considered not building at the Roseland site, giving consideration to the proximate presence of a shopping mall, an ambulatory center and the Essex County environmental Center.

(In response to a committee question, Ms. Staffel said that, complying with a FERC requirement, the full record of the FERC application is present in the Roseland Free Public Library).

Questioned about further scheduled venting prior to turning on the system, Mr. DiCocco said that he would get back to the committee regarding scheduled, smaller, required test venting of equipment being installed by Williams sub-contractors. These contractors include Rolls Royce, and Siemens, suppliers of major components. Dennis Morgen asked if the committee could be apprised of these scheduled venting events.

At this time, according to Mr. DiCocco, Williams does not plan further depressurization or venting of pipeline segments similar to the series in mid-June. [A June 15th venting, of a 4-mile segment of pipeline, led to the evacuation of Noecker School].

Marcia Weinstein asked about the strong gas odor at the corner of Eisenhower Parkway and Eagle Rock Avenue. This odor, Mr. DiCocco explained, is from a leak in the systems operated by PSE&G. John Matthias, (Roseland Office of Emergency Management) was aware of the work being done by PSEG to resolve this leak.

Rubin Bedell read a specification regarding the ignition temperature for natural gas. Natural gas he read is flammable at 1200 degrees F. However, the document indicated that gas can be flammable at a much lower temperature if ignited by an electrical spark. Mr. DiCocco replied that he knew of only one incident in which an electrical discharge (from a downed power line) punched a hole in a buried pipeline. The small leak was detected: there was no fire.

Rubin Bedell asked Mr. DiCocco to comment on a documented incident that took place in Branchburg, NJ. Mr. DiCocco replied that the fire, which took place during a welding operation, was confined to the pipe. He said that there were no injuries [conflicting with articles appearing in the press].

Rubin asked about the storage of toxic materials at the compressor site. Mr. DiCocco indicated that Mr. Mathias had this information: the toxics are oil, waste water and hydrocarbon waste materials. [Flammable waste]. He commented on the amount of remediation done by Williams due to pollutants left in the site by the previous owner.

Dennis Morgan asked if it was common to build compressors next to high voltage lines [PSEG]. Mr. DiCocco said that it is typical that gas pipelines and high voltage lines share common 'rights of way" in most locales. This co-location is done more for local political reasons, minimizing eminent domain actions and land condemnation, than for technical reasons. *He did acknowledge that co-location of high voltage lines with compressor stations was not common*. (Emphasis added)

Rubin Bedell asked that Williams consider having the site staffed on a 24-7 basis, rather than only a 5-day, daytime shift, due to the unique presence of the PSEG High Voltage structures in immediate proximity to the station. Ben Krane also shared this concern, citing the unique co-location of the compressor and the high voltage lines.

[The PSEG high voltage line project upgrades power distribution capacity from 250 KV to 500 KV: (http://www.pseg.com/family/pseandg/powerline/index.jsp)]

Mr. DiCocco said that the commissioning of the station would follow a tour by local officials and emergency response personnel. At that time, safety manuals would be supplied to these local officials. The commissioning would follow a 'dummy' commissioning start-up with information, including safety response instruction, to be shared by local officials.

In response to additional questions concerning the typical chemical composition of natural gas, Mr. DiCocco reiterated the written responses to this question [see attached notes]. He indicated that Williams did gas chromatography studies of the gas to determine its composition. Some of the chromatography studies were triggered by their employees concerns about reports of Radon in the gas, which proved, he said, to be unfounded. He cited several specific studies supporting and refuting the Radon allegation. Ms. Staffel agreed to provide these studies to the Committee.

In response to Alan Egger's question about detection of other "heavy metal" elements or compounds, Mr. DiCocco said that their chromotograpy studies were not exhaustive: they were designed to detect Radon. [Radon is a radioactive gas released by the decay of radioactive elements such as Radon and Uranium and other heavy metals]. Mr. DiCocco identified a study done at a [Compressor] station (# 240, Carlstadt, NJ).

Chris Staffel said that she would send the committed a copy of a 'draft' news letter that, with committed approval, could be distributed to town residents concerning the station.

The committee meeting adjourned at 7 PM. The public meeting convened thereafter.

At the public meeting the Committee reviewed the responses from Williams to our questions, and received further input from the public attendees. The Mayor agreed to contact other cities dealing with Compressor Stations in order to benefit from their experiences, either good or bad. Cities sited are: Minnisink, NY; Lambertville, NJ;

Branchburg, NJ; Oldbridge, NJ; Wantage, NJ; Edison, NJ; Brooklyn, PA.

Submitted:

Alan Egger, Secretary